Lin v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-3-2013 
Lin v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Lin v. Atty Gen USA" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1438. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1438 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2085 
 ___________ 
 
XIU HUA LIN,  
a/k/a Xiu Yua Lin, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
  Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A070-838-767) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 26, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 







 Xiu Hua Lin petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) 
order denying her motion to reopen and to reconsider its previous denial of reopening.  




 We recite only those parts of the protracted background of this case relevant to our 
disposition.  Lin is a citizen of China who entered the United States without inspection in 
1993.  The Government charged her as excludable for lacking valid entry documents and 
for attempting to obtain them by misrepresentation.  When Lin failed to appear for a 
hearing in 1994, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered her deportation in absentia. 
 Following later proceedings under a different alien registration number, Lin 
moved to reopen her original proceeding in 2008 through counsel, Andre R. Sobolevsky.  
She argued that she had not received notice of the 1994 hearing and that the notice to 
appear sent to her former address had been returned to the Immigration Court as 
undeliverable.  On January 14, 2009, the IJ denied the motion on the ground that the 
record revealed it to be “simply not credible” and “potentially misleading.”  Lin appealed 
to the BIA, but the BIA agreed with the IJ and dismissed her appeal on April 7, 2010.  
Lin did not petition this Court for review. 
 Shortly thereafter, Lin retained present counsel, who filed a motion to reopen 
directly with the BIA.  Lin argued that previous counsel Sobolevsky rendered ineffective 
assistance by filing the motion to reopen with the IJ in 2008 without having met with her.  
She further disavowed the contents of that motion and asserted a different reason for not 
having received notice of the 1994 hearing—that she was victimized by a travel agency’s 
unauthorized practice of law.  She now claimed that she had taken the 1993 charging 
document to a travel agency and that someone there told her that the agency would “just 
take care of it.”  She also claimed that the travel agency gave the IJ a wrong address for 
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her.  In addition, she recounted various efforts she had taken to move her case forward 
over the years.  Among other things, she claimed to have consulted an attorney in 2002, 
who “told me that there was nothing to be done in my case, and if anyone told me 
otherwise, they were certainly lying to me.”  She claimed that “I felt so defeated when I 
heard this, and I didn’t know what else to do” until 2006, when she “heard about a law 
firm . . . that was famous for opening ‘dead cases.’”  She argued that, under the 
circumstances, she pursued her case with reasonable diligence. 
 The BIA denied the motion to reopen on June 3, 2011, for three reasons.  First, the 
BIA concluded that the requirements of In re Lozada
 Instead, and through the same counsel, she filed with the BIA the motion at issue 
here.  Lin requested that the BIA both reconsider its prior ruling and reopen her 
proceeding on the basis of the same evidence she had presented before.  She also attached 
new evidence showing that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the BIA have 
suspended Sobolevsky for misconduct unrelated to her case.  The BIA denied the motion 
on March 26, 2012.  With regard to reconsideration, the BIA concluded that the motion 
, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 
1988), apply to claims of “ineffective assistance” by non-lawyers and that Lin had not 
satisfied those requirements.  Second, and alternatively, the BIA concluded that 
reopening was not warranted in the exercise of its discretion because Lin had not shown 
due diligence in protecting her rights, particularly between 2001 and 2006.  Finally, the 
BIA concluded that Lin could not show prejudice from any ineffective assistance by 
Sobolevsky because her lack of diligence in the years before retaining him meant that 
reopening was not warranted in any event.  Once again, Lin did not petition for review. 
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was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of its last decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).  With regard to reopening, the BIA noted that it 
had previously considered Lin’s evidence in connection with her prior motion and that 
Lin had shown “no reason to alter that decision.”  The BIA also concluded that Lin’s new 
evidence concerning Sobolevsky does not “address or overcome” its previous ruling 
regarding Lin’s lack of diligence.  Lin petitions for review.1
II. 
 
 We begin by clarifying our scope of review.  Lin did not petition for review of the 
BIA’s ruling of June 3, 2011, denying her initial motion to reopen.  We thus lack 
jurisdiction to review that ruling directly.  See Stone v. INS
 That motion presented only three things that were not contained in Lin’s previous 
motion.  First, Lin argued that the BIA’s imposition of the 
, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).  
Our jurisdiction is limited instead to the BIA’s ruling of March 26, 2012, denying Lin’s 
motion for reconsideration of the June 3 ruling and for reopening.   
Lozada
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction over the BIA’s denial of  motions for reconsideration and 
reopening pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we review them for abuse of discretion.  
See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011).  “We give the BIA’s decision 
broad deference and generally do not disturb it unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary 
to law.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  We review the BIA’s underlying assessment of 
the record for substantial evidence, see Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 
2009), but review constitutional claims and legal issues de novo.  See Fadiga v. Att’y 
Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 requirements on her 
claim regarding the travel agency in its June 3 ruling was contrary to law.  Second, Lin 
challenged the BIA’s alternative conclusion in its June 3 ruling that she had not exercised 
due diligence by arguing that she had indeed exercised reasonable diligence under the 
5 
 
circumstances—i.e., that she was entitled to rely on an attorney’s advice in 2002 in taking 
no action for four years until she happened to hear of a different law firm.  Finally, she 
attached the new disciplinary documents regarding her former counsel Sobolevsky.   
 The first two of these arguments, which Lin repeats on review, were in the nature 
of arguments for reconsideration.  See Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“The BIA has described a motion for reconsideration as a ‘request that the Board 
reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps 
an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.’”) (quoting In re Ramos, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 2002)).  As the Government points out, however, Lin has raised 
no argument regarding the denial of reconsideration in her briefs.  Instead, her arguments 
on these issues read as though she were asking us to review the BIA’s previous ruling of 
June 3, not the March 26 ruling actually under review.  In an appropriate case, we could 
construe Lin’s arguments as impliedly challenging the BIA’s denial of reconsideration 
and review these issues because a challenge to the denial of reconsideration often 
requires some review of the underlying ruling.  See Castro, 671 F.3d at 364.  This, 
however, is not such a case.  The BIA identified these two arguments as seeking 
reconsideration (BIA Dec. at 1) (citing Motion to Reopen at 8-10), which it expressly 
denied as untimely.  Lin notes that ruling (Pet’r’s Br. at 14 & n.12) but does not challenge 
it on review.  Thus, we have no basis to reach these two issues because, even if we agreed 
with Lin (which we do not decide), the BIA’s denial of reconsideration would stand on 
the basis of a ruling that she does not challenge.  See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143-
44 (3d Cir. 1993).  In any event, Lin’s request for reconsideration was indeed untimely, 
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and we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in denying it for that reason.2
 That leaves Lin’s successive request for reopening.  The BIA denied that request 
on the grounds that (1) it already had considered Lin’s previous evidence and (2) Lin’s 
new evidence concerning Sobolevsky was not relevant to its prior conclusion that Lin 
failed to exercise due diligence between 2002 and 2006.  As the Government notes, Lin 
raises no argument that the BIA abused its discretion in denying reopening for the first of 
these reasons and we cannot say that it did.  The BIA has broad discretion in denying 
motions to reopen in general and repetitive motions in particular, 
 
see Derezinski v. 
Mukasey
 As for the BIA’s conclusion that Lin’s new Sobolevsky documents did not cure 
her lack of diligence, Lin argues that the BIA erred in requiring a showing of diligence 
because no time limitation applies to her motion to reopen.  
, 516 F.3d 619, 620-21 (7th Cir. 2008), and Lin has raised no argument 
addressed to the BIA’s refusal to entertain her repetitive motion in this case. 
See Rodriguez-Manzano v. 
Holder
                                                 
2 Lin argues in reply that all issues that the BIA addressed in its June 3 ruling are properly 
before the Court because the absence of a time limitation on motions to reopen exclusion 
proceedings (as opposed to motions for reconsideration) means that her motion “is an 
entirely new motion to reopen” that the BIA referenced its prior June 3 ruling in denying.  
This argument ignores that fact that Lin expressly sought reconsideration in addition to 
reopening.  All arguments going to the BIA’s reasons for denying reopening in its prior 
June 3 ruling were in the nature of arguments for reconsideration, and the BIA denied 
reconsideration on the basis of a timeliness ruling that Lin does not and cannot challenge.  
, 666 F.3d 948, 954-55 (5th Cir. 2012) (so holding).  Lin, however, has raised this 
argument for the first time on review.  Lin argued in her initial motion to reopen that she 
had exercised due diligence in protecting her rights.  (A.R. 159.)  After the BIA 
disagreed, she argued in the motion at issue here that she should be deemed to have 
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exercised due diligence because her inaction between 2002 and 2006 was reasonable 
under the circumstances.  (A.R. 41-43.)  She never suggested that the BIA could not 
require a showing of diligence in the first place.  Even if we were inclined to address this 
issue in the first instance, cf. Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that, although the statutory exhaustion requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) 
does not apply to motions to reopen that are not remedies available “as of right,” 
exhaustion may be required as a prudential matter), we would decline to hold that the 
BIA abused its discretion in relying on a consideration that Lin never argued was 
improper and instead affirmatively raised herself.3
 For these reasons, we will deny the petition for review 
 
                                                 
3 We thus need not and do not decide whether Rodriguez-Manzano is persuasive.  For 
purely informational purposes, however, we note that other courts have reached different 
conclusions.  See, e.g., Derezinski, 516 F.3d at 620-21 (approving BIA’s reliance on lack 
of diligence to deny a motion to reopen that was not subject to a time limitation); Lee 
Ting v. Holder, 391 F. App’x 119, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (not precedential) (same). 
